Hidden Market Design by Seuken, Sven et al.
 Hidden Market Design
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Seuken, Sven, Kamal Jain, and David C. Parkes. 2010. Hidden
market design. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth AAAI
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-10): July 11-15, 2010,
Atlanta, GA, ed. American Association for Artificial Intelligence,
1498-1503. Menlo Park, CA: AAAI Press.
Accessed April 17, 2018 3:34:34 PM EDT
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:9121285
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAP
Hidden Market Design
Sven Seuken
School of Engineering & Applied Sciences
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138
seuken@eecs.harvard.edu
Kamal Jain
Microsoft Research
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
kamalj@microsoft.com
David C. Parkes
School of Engineering & Applied Sciences
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138
parkes@eecs.harvard.edu
Abstract
The next decade will see an abundance of new intel-
ligent systems, many of which will be market-based.
Soon, users will interact with many new markets, per-
haps without even knowing it: when driving their car,
when listening to a song, when backing up their files,
or when surfing the web. We argue that these new sys-
tems can only be successful if a new approach is cho-
sen towards designing them. In this paper we introduce
the general problem of “Hidden Market Design.” The
design of a “weakly hidden” market involves reducing
some of the market complexities and providing a user
interface (UI) that makes the interaction seamless for
the user. A “strongly hidden market” is one where some
semantic aspect of a market is hidden altogether (e.g.,
budgets, prices, combinatorial constraints). We show
that the intersection of UI design and market design is
of particular importance for this research agenda. To
illustrate hidden market design, we give a series of po-
tential applications. We hope that the problem of hidden
market design will inspire other researchers and lead to
new research in this direction, paving the way for more
successful market-based systems in the future.
1 Introduction
The Internet has allowed market-based systems to become
increasingly pervasive. Many people think of Amazon or
eBay when they hear about electronic markets and they
feel comfortable interacting with these markets. However,
we are now seeing more and more non-traditional markets
emerging. For example, users can pay money for ques-
tions answered on the web (Hsieh and Counts 2009). Some
toll roads adjust their prices dynamically as traffic changes.
Digital content like music files is sometimes priced vari-
ably based on demand. Recent progress on micropayment
systems might soon pave the way for many new electronic
markets by significantly reducing transaction costs. These
new markets can be quite complex, with users having lim-
ited budgets, dynamically changing prices, lots of com-
modities being traded, and potentially complex combina-
torial constraints imposed on any of these trades. At the
same time, the users of these markets will generally be non-
sophisticated as these systems are designed for “the masses.”
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Figure 1: The Hidden Market UI wraps around the complex
underlying market. The choice of the market design and the
agents’ actions together determine the equilibrium.
The users might find monetary transactions unnatural in
some domains or they might not expect a market at all. Thus,
while these new markets often provide large benefits to the
users, they can also be unnatural or complex such that indi-
viduals may not have an easy time interacting with them.
For these new market-based systems to be successful, un-
sophisticated users need simple methods to interact with
them. We must help users make optimal decisions, in partic-
ular when they are reasoning about small amounts of value,
or need to make many small decisions repeatedly. In many
environments, this will require automatically eliciting users’
preferences. Designing these markets, given all of these con-
straints, is the problem we introduce in this paper and which
we call Hidden Market Design. We argue that many of these
new market-based systems require a design that masks some
complex market concepts such as prices, account balances,
trading constraints, etc. from the user, i.e., that hides the un-
derlying market to a certain degree. We propose the design
of a “Hidden Market UI” wrapped around the actual mar-
ket, which shall expose a simplified interface, assist the user
with intelligent agent technology and potentially aggregate
the decision making process for the user. A general model
is illustrated in Figure 1.
When designing hidden markets, we must help users build
appropriate mental models that allow them to take optimal
actions on the market. For a market to work, we need a con-
stant feedback loop between the user and the market. If we
hide the market too much, for example if we don’t display
prices in a multi-commodity market, users might not realize
that different commodities have different values, and the ef-
fect of the market would be lost. Thus, hidden market design
will always involve making a trade-off between hiding cer-
tain market complexities on the one side, and maximizing
economic efficiency of the market on the other side. Suc-
cessful markets will require making the interaction for the
user as easy as possible while still maintaining a true feed-
back loop between the user and the market.
2 The Hidden Market Design Challenge
The “Hidden Market Design” challenge is to find new
techniques and approaches towards designing and build-
ing “hidden markets” for non-sophisticated users. The
primary goal for the design of “weakly hidden markets”
is to find the right trade-off between hiding or reducing
some of the market complexities while maximizing eco-
nomic efficiency attained in equilibrium. The design of
smart user interfaces shall enable users to seamlessly in-
teract with the market. A “strongly hidden market” is one
where some semantic aspect of a market is hidden alto-
gether (e.g., budgets, prices, trading constraints, etc.).
We find the distinction between weakly hidden markets
and strongly hidden markets useful for defining the particu-
lar research challenge one wants to pursue:
Weakly hidden markets describe the more general
paradigm where some of the market complexities are sim-
ply reduced. For example, imagine the price for some ser-
vice is constantly changing (e.g., the true price of electricity)
but for the hidden market design, you choose to only display
two different price levels to the user, a “high” and a “low”
level. This would qualify as a weakly hidden market. An-
other example would be if you designed a market where you
combine the preferences and decisions from multiple users
in a sensible way, such that the individual user only needs
to interact with the market on a very infrequent basis. This
would also qualify as a weakly hidden market.
Strongly hidden markets are those in which some se-
mantic aspect of a market is completely hidden. For exam-
ple, if users have account balances which constantly change,
but if the market design does not require the users to ever
think about their account balances, then this would qualify
as a strongly hidden market. Another example is a domain
where the value of resource bundles is combinatorial and
requires non-linear pricing. If the market design hides this
aspect from the user by only displaying linear prices, then
this would also qualify as a strongly hidden market.
3 Required Research Approach
At this stage, hidden market design might still seem more
like an art than a science. But with more research, the re-
curring problems in designing hidden markets will soon be
isolated, formalized, and can then be addressed more scien-
tifically. We believe, the main contributions will be made by
combining two or more research areas. Certainly, economics
and market design are central to this research, to make sure
the system provides the right incentives and a desirable equi-
librium with high welfare properties is reached over time.
Figure 2: The UI Design/Market Design Funnel.
But almost as important is UI design and associated disci-
plines of cognitive psychology and behavioral economics.
The UI plays a particularly important role for four reasons.
First, the UI is the first point of contact between the user and
the system/market. If the UI is not well-designed, it will fail
to encourage user involvement, leading to very thin markets
and potentially their total failure if a critical mass cannot be
reached (Roth 2008). Second, the choice of the UI directly
constrains the market design space like a funnel (see Fig-
ure 2). For example, if one chooses to hide certain semantic
aspects of a market, this restricts the kinds of markets that
can be designed. Third, the UI defines the way users ex-
press their preferences, the way users are informed about
the current state of the market, and the way users can make
decisions and take actions that influence the market. Thus,
the UI defines what the feedback loop between the user and
the market looks like. Finally, the UI design can address one
aspect that is often neglected: the user’s cognitive costs.
In standard economic models, users’ cognitive costs often
remain unmodelled. This includes the costs for evaluating
an option, the costs for learning how to use a new interface,
and the costs for decision making. A domain where these
cognitive costs matter a lot is the Internet. For example,
consider a user’s decision about whether to buy a new MP3
for $0.99, or the decision about whether to pay $0.25 for an
article on the web. How many users will be able to correctly
evaluate whether the article is worth $0.25 cents to them? If
we consider advertising on the web, we get down to an even
smaller level of economic activity. Consider for example a
30 second video ad that users must watch before they can see
the actual video they were interested in (e.g., on IMDB or on
Hulu). Often times, the users could alternatively search for a
different website that hosts the same video without ads, they
could sign up for a monthly membership to some service, or
they could pay a one-time fee to see the video. Which alter-
native is the optimal one for the user depends on the user’s
value for time. However, at this level of economic activity,
standard rules of economic behavior become invalid and we
have to use “atomic economics,” a concept first introduced
by Kamal Jain. Once the cognitive costs for making a deci-
sion become larger than the possible value lost or gained by
making the decision itself, then optimal (economically ra-
tional) user behavior can no longer be assumed. This poses
a significant challenge for UI and market design. To pre-
vent users from repeatedly incurring these cognitive costs,
we must learn their preferences over time and ultimately as-
sist in making these small, atomic decisions. This is a point
where UI design and sophisticated AI technology must go
hand in hand to address this challenge.
Figure 3: A user interface for a P2P backup application. On the right side, users can specify bounds on their maximum supply.
On the left side, users see their current demand and the upper bound on how much they can consume given their supply choice.
4 Some Applications of Hidden Markets
In this section we discuss three concrete problems to illus-
trate the hidden market design challenge. We hope the de-
scription of these problems will help other researchers to get
a more concrete idea how hidden markets could look like.
A Hidden Market for P2P Backup
We started to explore the hidden market design problem in
our own work (Seuken et al. 2010a; 2010b), tackling the
problem of designing a hidden market for a P2P backup sys-
tem. The main idea of P2P backup is that users provide some
of their resources (storage space, upload bandwidth, down-
load bandwidth, and online time) in exchange for using the
backup service. Our P2P backup system is novel in that it
uses a market with a virtual currency to allocate resources.
The first challenge in designing this hidden market is the
combinatorial nature of the problem. All users must provide
a certain amount of all resources, even if they currently only
consume a subset of them. For example, a user who only
contributes storage space is useless to the system because
no files could ever be sent or received from that user. We
call these combinatorial requirements of the market the bun-
dle constraints because only bundles of resources are worth
anything. Displaying the bundle constraints in a simple way
is a major challenge for the UI design.
A second challenge is that all users have different pref-
erences regarding how much of each resource they want
to supply. Some users might need their own disk space a
lot and prefer to sacrifice their internet connection. Other
users might use their bandwidth for services like VOIP or
file-sharing and might prefer to give up space. We allow
different users to provide different ratios of their resources,
and we update prices regularly taking into account aggregate
supply and demand. However, exposing prices to the users
in an intuitive way is challenging, in particular because we
do not want to make the users think of a monetary market.
We simultaneously designed the market and the UI. Our
proposed UI (see Figure 3) allows the users to interact with
the market without specifying bid/ask prices. Instead, the
users only have to move three sliders to place bounds on
how much of each resource they want to maximally sup-
ply. The bundle constraints are realized via shaded areas
of those sliders, telling the users indirectly which resource
combinations are useful to the system. A bar chart showing
how much more a user can back up given the current supply
summarizes that user’s account. The users can infer the cur-
rent resource prices indirectly by moving the sliders while
observing the bar chart. If the user moves a slider a little and
the bar chart only changes a little, this means that the current
price for that resource is relatively low. If the user moves a
slider a little and the bar chart changes a lot, this means that
the current price for that resource is relatively high. This
allows us to communicate the market prices to a user in a
non-explicit way. In particular, users can be unaware of the
price-based market, and yet over time they will notice that
for some resources they get more in return than for others.
A Hidden Market for Smart Grids
The hidden market for the P2P backup application did not
involve any real money. When no money is involved, users
might have an especially hard time to understand the mar-
ket aspects of a system. However, even when real money is
involved and prices are natural in a domain, there are still
other aspects of a market that can be hidden.
One such domain where hidden markets seem particularly
suited are smart grids, the next generation of electricity net-
works (U.S. Department of Energy 2003). One major prob-
lem in the generation and distribution of electricity is that it
is very costly to store electricity. However, the demand and
the supply for electricity can vary significantly, even over
short periods of time. On the demand side, a sudden in-
crease in the outside temperature may induce many people to
start their air conditioners. On the supply side, clouds block-
ing the sun might significantly reduce the amount of solar
power generated. The major advantage of smart grids is the
combination of traditional electricity networks with digital
technology that enables the remote control of consumers’
appliances in their houses. This allows the system to react
to sudden changes in the electricity market. For example, at
times of low demand for electricity, the system might turn on
individual user’s washing machines in their homes. At times
of peak demand for electricity, the system might turn off or
reduce the power consumption of selected appliances (e.g.,
temporarily decrease the power given to air conditioners).
Additionally, smart grids also allow to charge consumers
different prices for their consumption, conditional on cur-
rent market conditions, via the use of smart meters.
Currently, governments are investing billions of dollars
into the development of smart grids, hoping that this will re-
duce overall energy consumption, inhibit the steady increase
of energy prices, lead to more energy independence, and
make energy systems more robust against failures. Conse-
quently, significant research efforts have recently gone into
the design of smart grids. However, to the best of our knowl-
edge, only little attention has been paid towards the design of
good user interfaces to interact with these new energy mar-
kets. Given that the whole concept of smart grids relies on
the active involvement of individual home users, it seems
crucial to develop UIs that encourage user involvement and
make it easy for the users to express their preferences.
Consider an example in which a user’s washing machine
is remote controlled. A user might load the washing ma-
chine in the afternoon, but might be happy if the machine is
done anytime between now and the next morning. Thus, the
smart grid could start the machine during the nighttime when
electricity is cheaper. However, users might also have a cer-
tain negative utility if the washing machine is running while
they are sleeping. What kind of UI would allow the users to
properly express their preferences regarding how much they
are willing to pay more in electricity costs if the washing
machine were not running during the night? Now consider
a user whose air conditioner can be remote controlled. The
user might set the AC to his most preferred temperature, but
would be willing to accept a slightly higher room tempera-
ture if this allows to save him some money. However, obvi-
ously the user would not accept a huge temperature increase
just to save a few pennies. Again, how would we design a UI
that elicits the user’s preferences regarding this trade-off?
When it comes to these decisions about accepting changes
in a user’s home environment in exchange for saving a lit-
tle bit of money, the user is again making decisions at the
atomic level. For any individual decision, the cognitive costs
for making the decision outweigh the potential savings asso-
ciated with it. Thus, clearly we must provide the users with
interfaces that let them specify their preferences in a more
general way, such that the users must only infrequently inter-
act with the market. Additionally, we can imagine interfaces
that alert the users only when large price changes happen
and the optimal decision cannot be made based on the user’s
past selection. In any case, it seems absolutely crucial to
make these UIs as easy to use as possible for smart grids to
become successful. The worst case that could happen would
be a completely deployed smart grid where the individual
users simply cannot be bothered to express their preferences
to the system because the UI is too complex. Then, the feed-
back loop between the electricity market and the user would
be lost and all the efficiency gains would be foregone.
A Hidden Market for Display Advertising
So far, we have presented one hidden market that works
without using money, and one market that explicitly uses
money. We now consider a market where real money might
be flowing, but without the knowledge of the users.
Consider the problem of online display advertising. For
example, when you read a New York Times article, you
might see a banner ad and many small ads throughout the
article. A recent study by Jain et al. (2010) has shown that
for an average length article, the presence of ads slows down
a user by about 27 seconds, compared to a version without
ads (taking into account page load time, reading time, and
navigation time when searching for information). Jain et al.
discuss the important point that for many content providers
the expected profit from display advertising is very small,
often on the order of 0.1 cents per page view. Now, if we
consider the time lost by the users and compare that to the
profits gained by the content provider, then the users’ time
is valued at about 13 cents per hour. We expect that for
most users, the marginal value of time is much higher than
that and consequently many users would be happy to pay the
content provider 13 cents if they could get their one hour of
time back. This illustrates that the display advertising mar-
ket exhibits a market failure and has reached a non-Pareto-
optimal equilibrium.
The solution to this problem is not straight-forward. If
the web site simply charged all of its visitors a small fee and
provided an ad-free version of the content in return, it would
lose most of its visitors. This is due to what one might call
the “penny gap”: there is a discontinuity point in the demand
function at 0, i.e., the demand for a particular product does
not drop continuously when the price is increased from 0
to 1 cent, but instead, for many online services, this small
price increase can cost them almost all users. But even if the
website gave its users a choice about whether to see the site
with or without ads, users would not want to register their
credit cards with every website they regularly visit. More-
over, here we again face the problem of atomic economics.
A user’s cognitive cost for making the decision whether to
view the ads or whether to pay a small amount of money
for an ad-free website would already exceed the potential
gains. Thus, it seems that a hidden market design could sig-
nificantly improve the efficiency of this market.
One possible avenue for improving the efficiency of this
market is by bundling the content provider’s service with
another service or product that derives high value from ac-
quiring a new customer. If the bundling partner pays the
content provider in return for acquiring the customer, the
content provider could provide an ad-free version of the
webpage to the user, thereby increasing overall efficiency.
There are many conceivable bundling partners. For exam-
ple, a wireless network provider like AT&T could be a po-
tential bundling partner, paying the websites to eliminate ads
when its users are visiting the website from their mobile
devices (where ads are particularly disturbing). Along the
same lines, a search engine could offer its users to pay the
content provider if the user visits the website coming from
the search engine because search ads generate much larger
revenues than display ads. A third bundling partner could
be a hardware manufacturer like Apple. When a user visits
a website on the iPhone or the iPad, Apple could pay con-
tent providers for removing the ads because Apple can make
much higher revenues from showing ads in their apps. In
all of these examples, money would be flowing from the po-
tential bundling partner to the content provider, but the user
would not be involved in any monetary transaction, yet ben-
efit from the ad-free website. However, this poses a new
market design challenge. The users’ preferences regarding
the online content are important to determine the right price
that should be paid to the content provider, but the user is no
longer inside the feedback loop with the market. Thus, the
resulting research question is how to indirectly involve the
user in this market to set prices. One can imagine the use
of machine learning techniques to learn users’ preferences
over time with only minimal user interaction (e.g., very in-
frequently asking the users a question regarding the ads).
Collaborative filtering techniques could be used to identify
users with similar preferences (here with respect to ads and
time/money trade-off) and then use the aggregated data to
infer the right price for the display advertisement. However,
the design of such learning algorithms and the details of such
a hidden market UI are all open research questions.
5 Categorization of Hidden Markets
We have identified the following three dimensions along
which hidden markets can be categorized:
• Amount of Market Hiding
• Amount of Market Complexity
• Amount of User Interaction
The amount of market hiding describes the degree to
which a semantic aspect of the market is hidden from the
user. For example, in the P2P backup application, the UI is
designed such that some users did not even know they were
interacting with a market at all. Furthermore, this is an ex-
ample of a “strongly hidden market”: we completely hide
the concept of account balances from the users and we avoid
non-linear bundle pricing despite combinatorial constraints
between supplied resources. In contrast, the suggested mar-
ket for smart grids would only be “weakly hidden” because
money will be natural in that domain and it will be clear to
users that consuming off-peak energy will be cheaper, in-
dependent of the actual UI which users use to express their
preferences. The hidden market for display advertising also
exhibits a high amount of market hiding because we sug-
gested to completely hide the payments from the users even
though real money would be flowing.
The amount of market complexity describes how diffi-
cult it is for users to use the market interface. The P2P
backup application provides a simplified interface, however,
the users still need to interact with a combinatorial market
and get used to the bundle constraints that are present. The
adopted goal in the smart grid example is to reduce the mar-
ket complexities as much as possible because encouraging
user interaction seems most important in this domain.
The amount of user interaction describes the frequency
and intensity of interaction required by an individual user
for the market to work well. In the P2P backup application,
most users needed to interact with the market, but only peri-
odically (e.g., every few months). In the smart grid example,
all users needed to interact with the market, potentially every
day when prices are changing or when they make decisions
about using appliances in their homes. For the display ad-
vertising market, we would hope that by using appropriate
learning and aggregation algorithms, only a few users would
need to interact with the market and only once in a while.
To summarize, we have seen that depending on the par-
ticular application/domain, hidden markets can vary signif-
icantly along three design dimensions. We believe that the
general hidden market design process will involve the fol-
lowing three steps: first, we start with the problem domain
at hand and identify the minimum amount of market hiding,
the maximum amount of market complexity and the maxi-
mum amount of user interaction that is feasible in the do-
main. Second, we determine how the resulting constraints
on the UI design space constrain the market design space.
Third, we choose the optimal combination of UI design and
market design for the particular application subject to the
constraints identified before.
6 Evaluating Future Progress
Evaluating a hidden market design is inherently difficult be-
cause markets require a large number of users to even start
working. Moreover, in many systems, individual users may
have a start-up cost for getting used to the UI and only re-
alize benefits from the market after using the system for a
while. All of these things are difficult to measure in a lab
or in simulation, before deploying the actual market. Nev-
ertheless, we believe the following three methods can help
evaluate a particular design.
First, we can use theoretical analysis to see how well the
proposed design meets the criteria. For example, we can
analyze the incentives of the market to determine whether
strategic behavior will be problematic. Naturally, an incen-
tive compatible market mechanism results in less complexity
for users. Furthermore, we can work with simple user mod-
els and compare different market designs, for example with
respect to efficiency or revenue considerations. Finally, we
can analyze whether the amount of information we get from
the hidden market UI is sufficient for the market to work
well and will lead to a desirable equilibrium.
Second, we can conduct a usability study to evaluate the
UI. Whether the design is good or not can be tested by invit-
ing users into a lab, giving them concrete tasks to complete
with the new application/product, and then evaluate whether
the right mental models have been invoked such that the in-
teraction with the market can be deemed successful. This is
the approach we have taken to evaluate the UI for the P2P
backup application (Seuken et al. 2010b).
Third, if we believe we have a reasonably good user
model (perhaps established before via user studies), we can
use an empirical evaluation of the underlying market via
simulations. This can inform us about convergence prop-
erties of the market, its robustness against demand/supply
shocks, etc. Thus, simulations can complement the evalua-
tion of the UI via usability studies, because we will generally
not be able to study long-term market behavior in the lab.
7 Related Work
In addition to a deep understanding of how existing markets
work, recently researchers are also gaining a better under-
standing of how to design new ones (Roth 2008). This has
given rise to a new field called market design. A fundamen-
tal assumption many designers of electronic markets make is
that participants are sophisticated users able to specify bids
in an auction-like framework (e.g., (Hahn 2001)). A partic-
ularly sophisticated UI design for a combinatorial market is
described in (Sandholm 2007). However, unlike in sourcing
auctions, the users of those new markets we have in mind are
non-experts and thus such interfaces would not be practical
and almost certainly lead to market failures.
Recently, HCI researchers have gotten more interested in
topics at the intersection of UI design and economics. Hsieh
et al. (2008) test whether the use of markets in synchronous
communication systems can improve overall welfare. Hsieh
and Counts (2009) explore a similar idea in the domain of
Q&A applications where users could attach payments to
their questions. While the use of the markets is similar in
vein to our approach, i.e., using markets to most efficiently
allocate resources, in both papers they used a very explicit
UI showing monetary prices to the users. This is something
the hidden market approach tries to avoid.
MySong (Morris, Simon, and Basu 2008; Simon, Mor-
ris, and Basu 2008) is an application that allows musical
novices to compose new songs. The authors have success-
fully designed and tested an interface that lets users interact
with complicated elements of the underlying machine learn-
ing system in an intuitive way. Although this work does
not concern the design of market interfaces, the approach is
similar to ours, in the sense that their user interface is also
designed to hide the complexity of the underlying system
while maintaining the important feedback loop.
Satu and Parikh (1995) compare live outcry market inter-
faces in scenarios like trading pits and electronic interfaces.
They draw a distinction between trying to blindly replicate
the real world in the UI, and locating “defining characteris-
tics” that must be supported. In our work, we adopt this phi-
losophy and attempt to mask the unnecessary affordances in
the hopes that the relevant ones become easier to use.
An application that addresses directly the hidden markets
problem is Yoopick, a combinatorial sports prediction mar-
ket (Goel et al. 2008). This application provides an intuitive
UI for trading on a combinatorial prediction market. The
designers successfully hide the complexity of making bets
on combinatorial outcomes by letting users specify point
spreads via two simple sliders.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced a new research challenge
that we call Hidden Market Design. As market-based sys-
tems become ubiquitous, millions of non-sophisticated users
will interact with them on a daily basis and thus these mar-
kets need special designs. The main goal of “weakly hid-
den markets” is to reduce the market complexities and pro-
vide UIs that allow users to seamlessly interact with these
markets. “Strongly hidden markets” go a step further and
completely hide some semantic concept of a market (e.g.,
prices, budgets, constraints). We have shown that the inter-
section of market design and UI design is of particular im-
portance for this research agenda because the choice of the
UI has a huge impact on users and furthermore constrains
the market design space. Even though we cannot yet envi-
sion all of the different kinds of electronic markets that will
emerge in the near future, we are sure that many of them
will need to be hidden to be successful. We hope that this
challenge inspires many researchers to make contributions
towards hidden market design, to pave the way for more suc-
cessful market-based systems in the future.
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